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A Critique of Political Economy 
II. A Post-Mortem on Cambridge Economics* 
By FRANZ OPPENHEIMER 
Was wankt, soil man auch noch stossen.t 
FRIEDERICH NIETZSCHE 
Introduction 
NEARLY HALF A CENTURY ago the present writer laid the first foundations 
of his theory of economics, now completed. Since that time he has seen 
four schools of economic thought, which then were competing for pre-
dominance, pass into the discard. 
The classic, or rather the post-classic "bourgeois" school of economics 
was already doomed beyond hope when John Stuart Mill felt himself honor 
bound to abandon the wage-fund theory and, with it, the complete theory 
of distribution. The "Historical School of Economics" was the first of its 
assailants to vanish almost without leaving a trace, breaking down under 
the onslaught of scientific Marxism on the one hand, and the different 
schools of marginal utility on the other hand. Both of the conquerors, a 
generation later, had lost almost the last of their devotees. 
"Bourge~is" economics-the theory that attempts to justify existing 
property relationships-attempted in vain to win new strength by adopting 
parts of its adversaries' ideas, first of socialism, then of marginalism. The 
result, in the former case, was "the socialism of the chair," which expired 
with its great representative, Adolph Wagner. The second attempt was 
that of the Cambridge School of Alfred Marshall and his pupils. It had 
no better fate; it is bankrupt as well, as is acknowledged by its best men, 
such as, for example, John Maynard Keynes: 
Modern theories on economics are mere concoctions as imprecise as the 
initial assumptions they rest upon, which allow the author to lose sight of 
the complexities and interdependencies of the real world in a maze of pre-
tentious and unhelpful symbols.1 
The same is very moderately expressed by Maurice Dodds: 
The social philosophy underlying it represents, like that of John Stuart 
Mill, nineteenth century bourgeois liberalism with a bias toward social re-
,. Copyright, 1943, by Franz Oppenheimer. 
t What is staggering ought to be pushed. From Zarathustra. 
l"The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money," German tr., p. 2J2. 
24 Vol. 2 
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form. In recent years doubt has increased rather than diminished. 
The post-war generation is more sceptical than its sire and is more conscious 
of the loose ends that still remain untied; it recognizes that, particularly in 
the theory of distribution, there is still much that is confused and un-
charted, perhaps internally inconsistent.2 
This essay will seek to discover the cause of these judgments within the 
theoretical structure of the Cambridge School, by an analysis of its funda-
mental work, Marshall's "Principles of Economics."8 
Definition of Economics 
THE FIRST ERROR of moment in Marshall's system is the misunderstanding 
of what economics is. Marshall defines it as 
a study of mankind in the ordinary business of life; it examines that part 
of individual and social action which is most closely connected with the 
attainment and with the use of the material requisites of well-being. Thus 
it is on the one side a study of wealth; and on the other, and more important 
side, a study of man.' 
And again: 
Economics is thus taken to mean a study of the economic aspects and con-
ditions of man's political, social and private life; but more especially of his 
social life. 
This definition is utterly incorrect. It assigns to economics a great 
many of the problems that belong to general sociology. This is realized 
when one considers the remainder of the first, introductory chapter. It 
tells how "the character of man has been moulded by his everyday work 
and his religious ideals," how poverty is apt to spoil the character and the 
race. It asks whether "we may not outgrow the belief that poverty is 
necessary." It assures us that "the fundamental characteristic of modern 
industrial life is not competition, but self-reliance, independence, choice 
and forethought," that "man is not more selfish, nor more dishonest than 
he was," and that "dreams of a Golden Age are beautiful but misleading," 
etc. 
The conseque!lce of this erroneaus foundation is that the book is not in 
the least what its title indicates, an exposition of "principles," i.e., a system 
of logically-connected tenets covering an exactly limited field of facts and 
presenting in their totality the doctrine of theoretical economics, neither 
2 Maurice Dodds, "Economics," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. 
3£ighth edition, New York, 1925, hereafter cited as "P.E." 
'P.E., I, I, 1. 
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more nor less. It is a work that brings together a wealth of facts and 
opinions on all three branches of practical economy (private economics, 
public finance, and economic policy, particularly industrial, but also agri-
cultural economic policy). Here and there, there is, moreover, the disjecta 
membra of almost all the social sciences: individual and social psychology, 
general sociology, history, theory of statistics, moral science: a catch-all of 
facts and intimate and tentative opinions "de omnibus rebus et aliquot 
aliis." Some minor problems are expatiated upon, some major ones ignored 
or dodged. It reminds the expert of Gustav Schmoller's Volkswirtschafts-
lehre, which, precisely in the same manner, attempted to mire economics in 
a hotchpotch of social science--or what he believed to be science. The 
attempt miscarried there as here; it is bound to miscarry whenever it is 
made. Marshall himself realized it: 
Economics has made greater advances than any other branch of the social 
sciences, because it is more definite and exact than any other. But every 
widening of its scope involves some loss of this precision. 5 
He is forced to confess that "the science is still in its infancy"6 and that 
"it can never become a simple science.m 
The same imperialistic tendency of expanding the scope of economics 
was at the root of the Institutionalist School. Wesley C. Mitchell disclosed 
this in his remark: 
The future of economics, the question whether man will ever succeed in 
establishing a serviceable science of human behaviour, becomes one of the 
crucial issues on which hangs the doubtful fate of mankind.8 
But human behaviour is the problem, not of economics alone, but of gen-
eral sociology and the special sociologies, especially of social psychology. 
Economics is concerned neither with the motives nor with the aims of 
human behavior, but merely with the means that are usually employed to 
attain desired goals. This is clear by the following definition: 
Economics is the science of the social economy of the economic society 
(or of the group economy of the economic collectivity). It is, as the 
definition indicates, one of the social sciences. It shares with them the com-
mon "subject of experience," the "historico-societarian reality" (Dilthey), 
and, like all the others, it prepares its own "subject of cognition" by select-
6 P.E., Appendix E, 6. 
8 P.E., I, I, 30. 
7 P.E., V, VIII, 1. 
s Quoted by E. L. Bogart, "Economics," Encyclopaedia Americana. 
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ing out of this enormous mass the phenomena that have particular interest 
for it: economic actions and their creations in space and time. In other 
words, its data are concerned with the process through which a group 
secures and takes care of the things of value that its members desire and 
are able to obtain. 
Economic actions are distinguished from all other kinds of action by the 
following characteristics: 
1. They are motivated by the desire of having something (or of having 
the power of disposal over something), but not by the desire of doing 
something. 
2. They are neither instinctive nor impulsive, but considered, and espe-
cially rational actions, i.e., actions conforming to the principle of the mini-
mum means. 
3. The things desired are things of value; this means they are not free 
goods, but are "scarce," costing expenditure either of labor or of possessions 
of other things of value. 
II 
Conflict of Economic Motives 
THIS CONFUSION REGARDING the scope and the task of economics rests 
entirely on the erroneous assumption that the science is concerned with the 
conflict of the motives of economic action: 
The measurement of motive thus obtained is not indeed perfectly accurate; 
for, if it were, economics would rank with the most advanced physical 
science, and not, as it actually does, with the least advanced.9 
Marshall has a very adequate knowledge of this conflict or this "crossing 
of motives" and of the decisions to which it leads: 
First, decisions as to the relative urgency of various ends; secondly decisions 
as to the relative advantages of various means of attaining each end; thirdly 
decisions based on these two sets of decisions as to the margin up to which 
the person could most profitably carry the application of each means to 
each end.10 
This is perfectly true. The decisions as to the first and second point 
make the action comidered, and the decision as to the third point makes it 
rational. It is incorrect, however, to say that this process of considering 
and choosing is a subject matter of economics. Economics, as Marshall 
himself defines it is "a study of individual and social action," but not of 
the process preceding it which belongs exclusively to psychology proper. 
9 P.E., I, II, 7. 
1° P.E., V, IV, 4. 
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Economic action does not begin before the moment when the decisions 
are made, first, which of the conflicting desires is to be satisfied; secondly, 
which thing of value, apt to satisfy this preferred desire, is to be secured; 
and, thirdly, to what extent it is to be secured. And, on the other hand, 
economic action does not last beyond the moment when the coveted thing 
of value is attained. Between these two points, decision and goal, there is 
not the least obstacle; economic action has run its course, unhampered by 
the conquered motives and desires. 
Economic science, therefore, is concerned neither with the motives which 
precede, nor with the applications of the secured things of value to either 
consumptive or technical purposes which follow the action of securing 
them. And, for this reason, in spite of what Marshall opines, it is a simple 




IT HAS BEEN SAID that the group economy of the economic collectivity is 
a process. It is one of those processes activated by antagonistic forces 
which can be explained satisfactorily only by determining the equilibrium 
toward which these forces, in our case supply and demand on the market, 
are tending. 
Such an equilibrium is called "static" in physics. Auguste Comte, who 
was an outstanding physicist, introduced the term into sociology; and his 
disciple, John Stuart Mill, into economics. Then John Bates Clark, espe-
cially, stressed the necessity of determining economic statics as the only 
possibility of attaining the highest goal of this as of all sciences: to arrive 
at quantitative formulas. It is, however, true, as Joseph Schumpeter 
emphasizes, that all good theory from its first beginnings in physiocratic 
doctrine was "essentially static," without being conscious of it; it is, as the 
great mathematician Cournot put it, a necessary assumption. 
Adam Smith, almost two centuries ago, solved the crucial problem of 
determining accurately economic statics, but failed to realize that his for-
mula is the very pass-key to all closed doors in economics. 
The whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employ-
ments of labour and stock must, in the same neighborhood, be either per-
fectly equal or continually tending to equality.12 
11 "It is hopeless. that we should have ere long an exposition of economic principles 
drawn up in quantitative formulas." J. E. Cairnes, "Some Leading Principles of Political 
Economy." · 
12 "The Wealth of Nations," Bk. I, ch. 10. 
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Almost a century later Johann Heinrich von Thuenen wrote: 
The equilibrium takes place when, through the price of the commodities, 
labor of equal quality is equally rewarded in all branches of production; 
and this average reward is the measuring rod for the costs of production 
and for gain and loss.13 
The equilibrium, therefore, is that level of prices where all producers 
enjoy the same income from the gains on the prices of their products, unless 
differences of qualification and, as Smith added, monopolies, cause diver-
gences. 
This can be expressed in a very simple quantitative formula. Let us call 
Thuenen's "average income" (i.e., the amount of money which is the in-
come of the greatest group of equally-qualified producers) J, and denote 
by + q the higher or lower earnings of more or less qualified producers; 
and by + m the gain of a monopolist or the loss of a monopolist's victim. 
Then the equilibrium is attained when the income of any member of this 
society {]1 ) is determined by the formula: 
J1=J + q1 +m1 
The present writer has shown elsewhere that this formula is the starting 
point from which the quantitative formulas for static value and for wages, 
profits and rent easily can be deduced. 
This clear and simple determination of statics has been ignored and for-
gotten by "bourgeois" economists, as almost all other achievements of the-
ory have been ignored and forgotten. Marshall is no exception. Like his 
predecessors, he was under the delusion that he had solved the problem by 
resorting to the interplay of supply and demand: 
The normal price being thus determined at the position of stable equi-
librium of normal demand and normal supply.H 
This eighth edition of the "Principles" was published in 192 5; but 
Thuenen, one of the most venerated of Marshall's authorities, had written 
as long before as 1850 that 
this explanation, confounding the conceptions, takes the facts for the ex-
planation of the facts, the manifestation for what causes the. manifestation.15 
And Boehm-Bawerk wrote that it "gives husks instead of grain." Marshall 
obviously believed he had evaded this trap because he determines supply and 
demand with the refined methods of Gossen's marginalism, but it remains 
13"Der isolierte Staat," (1826-63), Ed. Waentig, 1921, p. f29. 
H P.E., v, III, 1. 
15 op. cit., P· -436. 
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the old merry-go-round of thought: the normal price obtains at the position 
of stable demand and supply; and this position obtains when prices are 
normal. It is the prettiest sample imaginable of a vicious circle. 
Under these circumstances Marshall is compelled to confess: 
The pure theory (of equilibrium) in its earlier stages diverges but little 
from actual facts; but, if pushed far, its practical value rapidly diminishes.16 
IV 
Comparative Statics 
IN ORDER TO COMPREHEND fully what is to be achieved and tO what 
extent efforts have failed, some words must be said on the method of 
statics to be employed in economics. The present author was the first to 
distinguish between the methods of simple statics and of comparative 
statics. The former is to be employed in simple processes, i.e., processes 
where there is no development, or where we are not interested in an exist-
ing development. It consists in determining the equilibrium and measur-
ing the "kinetic" deviations caused by "disturbances" from without the 
system. Thus, for example, the height of the tides is measured by refer-
ring to the static "zero-level" of the ocean. 
Where there is a process of development in which we are interested, this 
simple method must be supplemented by comparative statics, comparing 
different successive static levels. To illustrate by an example: a physician 
examining a sick person employs the method of simple statics when he 
judges the significance of his temperature, etc., by the data of statics, i.e., 
health. But, when examining a healthy child, he employs the method of 
comparative statics by referring weight, height, intelligence, etc., to the 
data normal to a child of that age and sex, to find out whether the particu-
lar child under examination shows normal or abnormal development. 
The social and especially the economic process is a process of evolution 
which must be correspondingly treated. 
Kinetics has for its objective competition. It shows how, in the con-
catenation in space and time of the markets, prices continually approach 
to that level, described by Adam Smith and Thuenen, where each producer 
earns the income falling to him according to his qualification and his posi-
tion as to monopolies. 
Statics has for its main objective distribution. It studies to what extent 
differences of qualification and monopolies are responsible for the diver-
gences from the "average reward of labor" in our "capitalist" society; or 
16 P.E., V, XII, 3. 
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why the social product is divided at all, and why in precisely these, "given" 
proportions into wages, profits and rent. 
Comparative statics has for its objective the "tendency of evolution," 
studying signally the effect of increasing population and its sequels in 
higher graduated co-operation, improved technique and growing output 
per capita in industry and agriculture. 
The only thing that can possibly be said to recommend the manner in 
which Marshall has treated this essential subject matter of statics is that he 
possessed a faint notion of comparative statics. He discriminates between 
what is "normal" in short and long periods.17 He is, however, much too 
much concerned with the fluctuating market prices which are of the high-
est interest for his "businessman," but of only slight interest for economic 
theory, to understand fully the importance of this discrimination. He 
writes, for example: 
Normal costs of production and reproduction are controvertible terms.18 
This, however, is true merely as a simple static consideration, because here 
supply and demand, it is assumed, remain unchanged. But it is decidedly 
wrong for comparative statics, when account is taken of the laws of 
increasing and diminishing returns. He himself writes: 
The statical theory of equilibrium is therefore not wholly applicable to 
commodities which obey the law of increasing returns.19 
This is only one, and certainly not the worst, example of the indeter-
minateness and indistinctness prevailing in these chapters; it is the same 
confusion of which we had cause to complain in the first section, of ele-
ments which it was our task to disentangle and cleanly to separate. 
17 P.E., V, V, I. 
18 P.E., V, Vll, s. 
19 P.E., V, XV, 4. 
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